Unravelling Ariadne's Thread: Exploring the Threats of Decentalised DNS by Patsakis, Constantinos et al.
Unravelling Ariadne’s Thread: Exploring the
Threats of Decentalised DNS
Constantinos Patsakis1,2, Fran Casino1, Nikolaos Lykousas1, and
Vasilios Katos3
1University of Piraeus
2Athena Research Center
3Bournemouth University
Abstract
The current landscape of the core Internet technologies shows con-
siderable centralisation with the big tech companies controlling the vast
majority of traffic and services. This has sparked a wide range of de-
centralisation initiatives with perhaps the most profound and successful
being the blockchain technology. In the past years, a core Internet in-
frastructure, domain name system (DNS), is being revised mainly due to
its inherent security and privacy issues. One of the proposed panaceas is
Blockchain-based DNS, which claims to solve many issues of traditional
DNS. However, this does not come without security concerns and issues,
as any introduction and adoption of a new technology does - let alone
a disruptive one such as blockchain. In this work, we discuss a num-
ber of associated threats, including emerging ones, and we validate many
of them with real-world data. In this regard, we explore a part of the
blockchain DNS ecosystem in terms of the browser extensions using such
technologies, the chain itself (Namecoin and Emercoin), the domains, and
users which have been registered in both platforms. Finally, we provide
some countermeasures to address the identified threats, and we propose a
fertile common ground for further research.
Keywords: Malware, DNS, Blockchain, Blockchain Forensics, Cybercrime
1 Introduction
One could argue that there is a periodic paradigm shift between centralisation
and decentralisation in computer science. A representative example is the tran-
sition from mainframes with dummy terminals to personal computers or the
shift from centralised local storage to the cloud. Although the Internet was
in principle designed to be distributed and decentralised by nature, in reality,
the control is placed onto a relatively limited number of stakeholders and the
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quest for further decentralisation is becoming an imminent need. Such require-
ment manifests in many ways, see for example the case of net neutrality, or the
concept of crowdsourcing which also attempts to address efficiency and sustain-
ability issues. As such, in recent years, we are witnessing an increasing demand
and creation of decentralised services.
The most profound example is the blockchain technology, which is being
widely deployed in various and different fields [7]. In different forms, this decen-
tralisation shift is gradually being realised in traditionally centralised services,
such as DNS. DNS is a distributed database with a centralised data governance
model, primarily controlled by ICANN. In this regard, ICANN manages the
top-level domains (TLDs), and the operation of root name servers. In practice,
once a client needs to contact a server for which it knows the name but not its IP
address, it performs a query to a particular DNS server which is known through
some network configuration protocol. Depending on how often this domain is
requested, it may be hosted in the cache of the DNS server. If this is not the
case, the query is propagated to the root name server which can find the servers
for the corresponding TLD and then forward the query to the corresponding
authoritative name server which would return the corresponding IP.
While DNS is currently one of the oldest still working Internet application-
level protocols, it has several drawbacks that mandate its replacement. For
instance, DNS does not support cryptographic primitives. Therefore, any query
and response can be intercepted by anyone in the same network, implying many
privacy issues. Moreover, anyone on the same network may inject a response of
an intercepted query, indicating many security risks. Furthermore, some regimes
have exploited DNS to censor unwanted web pages and services, and in the past
years, DNS servers have been used in amplification denial of service attacks and
their records have been poisoned.
Motivation: All the aforementioned issues have driven many researchers to
seek for alternative solutions to DNS. This is evident for example with the shift
towards, e.g. DNS over HTTPS1 and DNS over TLS2 and 83103, while others
are shifting looking for solutions beyond ICANN support. However, these so-
lutions are still centralised. One of the most promising decentralised solutions
is blockchain DNS which is already adopted by several chains, e.g. Ethereum,
Namecoin, and Emercoin, or specific protocols. In fact, despite their infancy,
blockchain domains have attracted the interest of several big players. A notable
example is Alibaba which recently filed a patent for a blockchain-based manage-
ment domain name management system4. A brief overview of blockchain DNS
and some scepticism was initially provided in [14]. So far, the proliferation of
blockchain DNS projects and research proposals (as later discussed in Section
2), are already being exploited by cybercriminals5. Therefore, we argue that
1https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8484
2https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7858
3https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8310
4https://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/alibaba-blockchain-domain-patent.pdf
5https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/how-cybercriminals-are-
using-blockchain-dns-from-the-market-to-the-bazar/
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there is a need for exploring threat models relating to novel blockchain solu-
tions 6, as well as decentralised file storage systems [20]. The decentralisation
of services may undoubtedly provide many new features in terms of privacy,
security and democratisation; nevertheless, sudden changes in the backbone of
well-established services and infrastructures may come at a significant cost. Ad-
versaries are expected to take advantage of such changes, by exploiting the lack
of knowledge, experience and maturity of the users, as well as inherent flaws
that are present in the early stages of a new technology. At the same time,
the use of encrypted and covert communications adds another layer of difficulty
to detect infected systems [21], for instance, in the case of botnets. Therefore,
it is imperative to raise awareness about the opportunities as well as the in-
troduced security threats. Moreover, a discussion and exploration of possible
countermeasures against the next generations of malware campaigns is also im-
perative. This paper aims to fill this research gap providing an overview of the
current state of the art and practice (Section 2) and a detailed presentation of
the emerging threats and how they could be amplified (Section 3). Further to
merely speculating future threats, we perform an investigation and analysis of
such ecosystem and illustrate that the landscape of converting these threats to
actual risks is already present. To this end, in Section 4, we showcase the results
of an in-depth analysis of Namecoin, Emercoin and Blockchain DNS crawling.
In this regard, note that the threats discussed and the outcomes retrieved form
the statistical analysis could be extended to other Blockchain DNS systems.
Finally, some remarks and findings are further discussed, along with possible
countermeasures in Section 5. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
paper that provides a discussion about the current state of practice and iden-
tification of novel threats beyond the actual state-of-the-art supported by data
analysed from real-world blockchain sources.
2 Background
2.1 Blockchain-based DNS
Blockchain-based DNSs have been receiving an ever increasing attention in re-
cent years [14]. According to Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar, a set
of approaches, some of which are fully functional, have emerged in the literature
since 2016. In what follows, we describe them and analyse the main features of
the most relevant and adopted solutions.
The work presented by Hari et al. [12] is one of the first works that propose
the use of blockchain to develop a DNS infrastructure. The authors discuss the
benefits of such a system over the main threats and drawbacks of traditional
models such as compromised hosts, spoofing, trust management, and its heavy
dependence on PKIs. [6] proposed a system named D3NS, which uses a dis-
tributed hash table and a domain name ownership implementation based on
the Bitcoin blockchain. They aim to replace the top-level DNS and certificate
6https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/Blockchain_Projects_List
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authorities, offering increased scalability, security and robustness. [18] proposed
a blockchain-based decentralisation DNS resolution method with distributed
data storage to mitigate single points of failure and domain name resolution
data tampering. [10] proposed the use of blockchain to enhance the certificate
validation procedure to create an improved DNS security extension, providing
the same benefits with DNSSec while overcoming its main drawbacks. Similarly,
in an attempt to reduce the level of trust in certificate authorities, [11] presented
AuthLedger, a blockchain-based system that provides efficient and secure do-
main name authentication. [29] introduced BlockZone which uses a replicated
network of nodes to offer efficient name resolution through an improved PBFT
consensus mechanism.
Some work focused on IoT systems and their communication protocols has
also been proposed. For example, [8] presented DNSLedger, a hierarchical
multi-chain structure in which domain name management and resolution are
performed in a decentralised way. The authors claim that their system could
enhance IoT-related communication technologies due to its efficiency. Block-
ONS, proposed by [31], is a system that aims to overcome classical problems
related to DNS resolution, namely DNS cache poisoning, spoofing, and local
DNS cracking. Authors propose a robust and scalable object name service, es-
pecially relevant for the IoT ecosystem. ConsortiumDNS was introduced by
[30] as a system based on a three-layer architecture composed by consortium
blockchain, a consensus mechanism and external storage. Authors claim that
their approach increases the efficiency of the overall system, compared to other
well-known approaches such as Namecoin or Blockstack. Finally, we may also
find some patented designs of Blockchain-based DNS systems in [16, 17].
Currently, there are several relevant and widely adopted blockchain-DNS
projects. Handshake 7 is one of the most widely supported technologies, which
aims at creating an alternative to existing certificate authorities. Therefore,
Handshake aims to replace the root zone file and the DNS name resolution and
registration services worldwide. The Ethereum name service (ENS)8 uses smart
contracts to manage the .eth registrar by means of bids and recently added the
support for .onion addresses. Namecoin9 is a cryptocurrency, based on Bitcoin,
with additional features such as decentralised name system management, mainly
of the .bit domain. It was the first project to provide a solution to Zooko’s
triangle since their system is secure, decentralised and human-meaningful. Nev-
ertheless, contrary to well-established blockchains like Bitcoin, Namecoin’s main
drawback is its insufficient computing power, which makes it more vulnerable
to the 51% attack. Practically, if an adversary manages to get a slight major-
ity of the computing power, she may rewrite the whole chain. Blockstack [2]
is a well-known blockchain-based naming and storage system that overcomes
the main drawbacks of Namecoin. Blockstack’s architecture separates control
and data planes, enabling seamless integration with the underlying blockchain.
7https://handshake.org/
8https://ens.domains/
9https://www.namecoin.org/
4
EmerDNS10 is a system for decentralised domain names supporting a full range
of DNS records. EmerDNS operates under the “DNS” service abbreviation in
the Emercoin NVS. Nebulis11 is a globally distributed directory that relies on the
Ethereum ecosystem and smart contracts to store, update, and resolve domain
records. Moreover, Nebulis proposes the use of off-chain storage (i.e. IPFS) as
a replacement for HTTP. OpenNIC12 deserves a special mention since it is a
hybrid approach in which a set of peers manages namespace registration, yet the
name resolving task is fully decentralised. OpenNIC provides DNS namespace,
and resolution of a set of domains, some of them agreed with Blockchain solu-
tions such as EmerDNS and New Nations13, the latter being a TLD provider for
nation-states that have not received a country code top-level domain (ccTLD).
Moreover, OpenNIC resolvers have recently added access to domains adminis-
tered by ICANN. In addition to namespace registrar, users can also create their
own TLD on request. Table 1 summarises the main features of the most relevant
Blockchain-DNS systems.
Table 1: Technical characteristics of the most relevant DNS systems. Although
Blockstack is blockchain agnostic, it is mainly used with Bitcoin blockchain.
Method Pedigree Platform Registrar and
Resolution Man-
agement
TLD Examples
ICANN Network of Servers and resolvers Centralised .com | .net | .org
OpenNIC Decentralised Servers Hybrid .bbs | .pirate |
.libre
ENS Ethereum Decentralised .eth | .onion
Handshake Bitcoin Decentralised unrestricted
Blockstack Blockchain agnostic Decentralised .id | .podcast |
.helloworld
Emercoin Bitcoin Decentralised .coin | .bazar |
.emc
Namecoin Bitcoin and Peercoin Decentralised .bit
Internet users can reach the TLDs offered by Namecoin, OpenNIC, New
Nations, and EmerDNS (e.g. .bit, .coin, .emc, .lib and .bazar) through
various browser extensions such as peername, blockchain-DNS and friGate
[9]. Their modus operandi is described in Figure 1.
2.2 Distributed platforms and C2
Nowadays, sophisticated malware campaigns are continuously emerging, focus-
ing on exploiting decentralised technologies such as blockchain and distributed
file storage (DFS). In the case of botnets, the use of technologies such as DFS
systems prevents the generation of NXDomain responses, which is a well-known
indicator of compromise type for malware using domain generation algorithms.
10https://emercoin.com/en/documentation/blockchain-services/emerdns/emerdns-
introduction
11https://www.nebulis.io/
12https://www.opennic.org/
13http://www.new-nations.net/
5
Blockchain DNS resolver
Domain 
resolution 
request
Device
DNS resolver
TLD analysis
Blockchain-based 
Traditional Procedure
.com
.net
.org
 ...
.coin
.bit
.bazar
 ...
Figure 1: Workflow of the browser extensions procedure to enable resolution
of EmerDNS, Namecoin, New Nations and OpenNIC domains. The extension
analyses the TLD extension of the requested domain and directs the query to
the corresponding DNS system.
In this regard, [20] extended the definition of domain generation algorithms
(i.e. a family of pseudo-random domain name generators to which an infected
host will try to connect to find the C2 server) into a more generic framework,
namely Resource Identifier Generation Algorithms (RIGA). Moreover, the au-
thors showed how DFS like IPFS could enhance malware campaigns due to their
attractive properties, such as immutability, efficiency and negligible costs. Bot-
net C2 management through Blockchain systems is also a threat, as proposed
in [3] and used in the case of the Cerber ransomware, analysed in [23]. In this
case, the malware finds the C2 based on transaction information of the bitcoin
blockchain. A more recent threat is the use of encrypted and covert communi-
cation channels such as in the case of DNSSec, DNS over HTTPS (DoH) and
DNS over TLS (DoT). Although these technologies, like in the previous cases,
hinder the possibility of using NXDomain information leaks to detect suspicious
behaviour, Patsakis et al. showed that even in such case some patterns might
emerge [21], which can be used to identify and classify DGA families accurately.
Regarding recent Blockchain-DNS systems, there exist a set of attack vectors
that can be exploited, such as in recent cases14.
3 The decentralised DNS threat
As previously stated, blockchain-based DNSs provide a set of characteristics,
which are summarised in Table 2. In this regard, one could argue that the
traditional DNS seems to be outdated, compared to the novel Blockchain DNSs.
Nevertheless, traditional DNS proofed their reliability and scalability from early
14https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/how-cybercriminals-are-
using-blockchain-dns-from-the-market-to-the-bazar/
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Figure 2: An overview of main threats of blockchain DNSs.
80’s until today with modest adjustments. Moreover, blockchain-based DNSs
exhibit a set of potential threats and attack vectors that must be considered[4,
28, 1, 27]. In the following sections, we analyse the most well-known threats
and identify novel ones as well as discuss their possible impact for the system
and the final users.
A summary of the emerging threats due to the adoption of blockchain DNSs
is depicted in Figure 2.
Table 2: Main characteristics of blockchain DNSs.
Property Description
Trust Verifiable and robust consensus mechanisms
Decentralisation The network is totally distributed with no central entities
Availability The availability of the network depends on multiple peers and not on
a single entity.
Censorship-resistant Access to information and domain name resolution are not subject to
borders or bans
Robustness Resilient to attacks that affect centralised DNS systems such as MiM,
spoofing, cache poisoning, cracking.
Unlimited Resources A high number of simultaneous users sharing their assets.
Namespace Freedom Registration of new SLDs and TLDs
Automated Management Auctions to register domain names, fast and transparent ownership
control
3.1 Malware
In the case of malware, blockchain-based DNSs offer considerable potential. Em-
ploying such technologies unlock the capability to register a substantial number
of domains with low entropy, which were not available in the market. Currently,
malware authors are using DGAs to generate domain names (i.e. algorithmi-
cally generated domains or AGDs); however, since most short and meaningful
domain names are not available, they resorted to the use of long and random-
looking domain names. Therefore, a compromised host which uses a DGA to
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resolve the C2 server issues many Non-Existent Domain (NXDomain) requests
which can be analysed and the attribution to the proper DGA can be made
efficiently.
With the use of blockchain-based DNS systems, the conventional NXDomain
requests will not be issued (see next section), hence hindering the detection
mechanisms. Moreover, by using domain names with lower entropy, many fil-
tering and machine learning algorithms are rendered useless. The latter practice
is exposed in Section 4.
Even more, the use of blockchain-based DNSs implies further issues for mal-
ware analysts. When performing static analysis of the malware and its reverse-
engineered code, the analyst and the tools that she uses must be aware of the
new domains. Traditional filters for domain names will fail, for instance, to
reveal calls to .bit domain as the resolution mechanism is completely differ-
ent. However, requests to traditionally benign domains, e.g. to google.com,
may resolve to a completely different IP and the same applies for case sensitive
domains, e.g. to GoOgle.com, or the use of spaces, e.g. goog le.com. While
Handshake, for instance, may have already taken some precautionary measures
for the highly visited domain names, this does not prevent the use of existing
domain names with less visibility being exploited to serve malware. Unfortu-
nately, as discussed in the next section, our data indicate that this attack vector
is something that will be used in the near future. Finally, it should be noted
that an adversary could easily perform fast fluxing and change the IP addresses
that are used whenever deemed necessary. As reported by deteque15, more than
100 domains registered in blockchain DNS registrars were used by C2 servers in
2018 implying that their use is actively being exploited by cybercriminals.
3.2 Underlying registrar mechanism
The primary methodology to register domains in blockchain DNSs is to perform
bids or auctions, being the first-request, first-served an outdated strategy. Nev-
ertheless, in the case of a vulnerability in the underlying bid system, users can
get control of domains as recently happened16. Moreover, most blockchain DNS
systems such as Emercoin allow the registration of case sensitive domains (as
we will discuss in Section 4), something infeasible in traditional systems. The
latter, if paired with some other unrestricted practices such as the use of spaces,
non UTF-8 or Ascii characters, may end up with an uncontrollable amount of
alternative domain names which may not be easily distinguishable from the le-
gitimate ones. Although this may be a target scenario for malicious actors, this
situation may have an impact to the trust and the will of users towards the sys-
tem. Note that these practices could be prevented and reverted in traditional
DNS, but not in blockchain DNSs. Therefore, careful design of the methodology,
as well as a proper implementation of the underlying smart contracts, should be
carried out to prevent this kind of behaviours. In the case of systems that offer
15https://www.deteque.com/news/abused-top-level-domains-2018/
16https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-name-service-auction-exploited-to-grab-
apple-domain-and-it-cant-be-undone
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the use of DNS name resolving services and the registrar of some TLD, a way to
prevent this is blacklisting them, although being a controversial strategy. This
threat is critical in systems like Handshake and others that may arise, aiming at
a full substitution of traditional mechanisms such as ICANN, since legitimate
names that are owned by an organisation in a conventional ICANN-supported
DNS may end up being controlled by malicious users.
In essence, an uncontrolled and fully decentralised DNS type of service may
lead to having parallel Internets. Note that each blockchain DNS system enables
the registration of arbitrary sets of TLDs, which may overlap with existing
ones. Therefore, the same domain would resolve to different IPs, depending on
the blockchain DNS system used. For instance, even if not used, the domain
google.com is registered in Emercoin in block 25236217. This opens a whole new
scenario of possibilities, in which users can have access to a myriad of contents
without restriction, yet in most cases, they could be owned by a malicious entity.
The latter problem, as we will discuss in the following paragraphs, is exacerbated
by other properties such as immutability.
3.3 Domain registration market
In the least sinister scenario, we consider the case of one registering the domain
name of an existing, legitimate webpage. Since the blockchain TLDs are not
known to the vast majority of people, it is expected that many people will rush
to buy such names requesting a good payment in exchange for the name. As
discussed in more detail in Section 4, this is not only a hypothesis but a real
case. Block 160356 of Emercoin18 illustrates such requests were the fees range
from $600 to $20,000.
The problem is actually an extension of domain backordering as in this
instance we are not dealing with expired domains, but with new TLDs. The
existence of ICANN and intermediates, e.g. registrars, allows in many cases the
arbitration or even the shutdown or handing over of a domain name; however,
the use of blockchain systems does not allow for such mechanisms to be applied.
In fact, at the time of writing, one can register a name for an arbitrary amount
of time in Emercoin. For instance, there are many domain names in Emercoin
which are registered for thousands of years, e.g. there are domains registered
up to 5014 and 12012 in blocks 200590 and 380209, respectively19.
3.4 Phishing
Phishing is a fraudulent practice which targets an audience to obtain valuable
personal information by using impersonation of entities, persons and more tech-
niques. According to State of the phish 2019 by Proofpoint[26], the number of
compromised accounts by these attacks varied from 38% to 65% from 2017 to
17https://explorer.Emercoin.com/block/252362
18https://explorer.emercoin.com/block/160358
19https://explorer.emercoin.com/block/200590 and https://explorer.emercoin.com/
block/380209
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2018. This type of cyber-attack leverages socially engineering methods to trick
users into performing activities that in some way; most usually monetary, will
benefit the attacker [15]. Email is by far the most widely used method to date
to perform phishing is email is the most popular avenue for a phishing attack,
with more than 90% of successful cyber-attacks/security breaches starting from
a spoofed email[22]. In fact, the automated nature of this attack, coupled with
the incapacity of users to determine a phishing attack [13] make the threat even
more dangerous. There are many factors which augment this threat and most
reside on the human-side aspect of the problem. For instance, the timing of
the attack, the authoritarian writing, as well as the exploitation of common
practices in an organisation, may significantly bias the user into accepting the
email as legitimate. Clearly, the use of spoofed or compromised email accounts
further complicates the situation.
In the context of blockchain DNSs, the problem is amplified. The users are
accustomed to visiting specific web pages and sending emails to particular ac-
counts. If these accounts are pointing to a similar address, e.g. changing the
TLD, many users are for sure expected to be tricked. The use of punycodes
for phishing or the use of different TLDs can be considered a norm in phishing.
With the introduction of blockchain DNSs, an adversary has far more options
as there is a wide range of domains that are becoming available at a minimum
cost. Practically, this means that not only the phishing sites may have a similar
domain name with legitimate ones, but with the use of, e.g. a Let’s Encrypt20
certificate, the fraudulent web pages may have valid and trusted HTTPS sup-
port. Therefore, the phishing page may have all the distinctive elements, from
the UI, the HTTPS support and the valid domain name, making it very difficult
for a common user to distinguish the original from the phishing page.
3.5 Lack of motivation
Motivation under the blockchain DNS paradigm is clearly related to the fea-
tures offered by such a system, including censorship resistance as one of the
main attractions. Nevertheless, these desirable features come at a cost, since
decentralised systems totally rely on their network of nodes and their partici-
pation. Therefore, keeping the user’s interest in blockchain DNSs is critical.
Unarguably, blockchain’s adoption in a myriad of scenarios is a reality [7].
Nevertheless, not all blockchain-based projects succeed. In this regard, accord-
ing to statistics retrieved from Deadcoins21 there exist approximately 1000 dead
cryptocurrencies and more than 660 fraudulent cryptocurrency attempts. In-
terestingly enough, as of 2018, ICO scams have already raised more than 1,000
million dollars22. Despite the existence of some awareness campaigns such as
HoweyCoin23, the lack of a specific and interoperable framework to pursue such
deviant behaviour enables the persistence of these practices. In the case of
20https://letsencrypt.org
21https://deadcoins.com/
22https://www.ccn.com/ico-scams-have-raised-more-than-1-billion-report-claims/
23https://www.howeycoins.com/index.html
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blockchain, this may hinder the creation of new projects as well as the persis-
tence of well-known and established ones. One of the main problems that could
arise is an unbalanced/unstable computational power, which could compromise
the underlying consensus mechanisms and trigger, for instance, a 51% attack.
Note that this attack may be applied regardless of the number of users that
use a blockchain DNS solution, as the attack is targeted towards the nodes that
store the blockchain which, depending on the rewards they have, their partic-
ipation may decrease over time. The latter may allow an adversary to control
the blockchain and compromise its integrity without having to exploit any, e.g.
software vulnerability of the system.
3.6 Immutability
The immutability property of blockchains, although standing as one of the main
beneficial features, may also be abused for malicious purposes. Well-known
blockchains such as Bitcoin Satoshi Vision (BSV)24 and Bitcoin Blockchain
have suffered from illegal data storage than cannot be deleted [5, 19]. The
lack of verifiable deletion mechanisms also enables DFS systems such as IPFS
and IndImm25 to host and disseminate illegal content [20]. Therefore, neither
contents nor domain names are subject to a take-down mechanism. Moreover,
strategies as blacklisting domains are unpractical if the number of domains is
high enough.
From a legal perspective, the GDPR does not consider the immutable na-
ture of blockchains and DFS. In this sense, novel decentralised technologies
implement features that are not aligned with current regulations and their re-
quirements, which prevents the possibility to apply requests such as the right
to be forgotten [25, 24]. Thus, the aforementioned facts make the combination
of blockchain DNS and DFS systems a fertile playground for malicious prac-
tices. For instance, at the moment of writing, Emercoin supports I2P links;
well-known for their anonymity, however, given the continuous rise of IPFS and
other DFS solutions, blockchain DNS systems may support IPFS in the near
future. The support of a permanent and distributed storage, like IPFS, with
blockchain DNS, would actually make a permanent link that cannot be taken
down. It is evident that the combination of both would be ideal for the distri-
bution of illegal content as the content would become permanently available for
everyone who has access to the link. It should be noted that there are already
initiatives that are making this bridge available, not for illegal purposes, e.g.
Unstoppable Domains26.
24https://bitcoinsv.io/
25https://en.cryptonomist.ch/2019/07/29/indimm-ripple-blockchain/
26https://unstoppabledomains.com
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4 Analysis of real-world data
To assess the extent of these threats, an analysis of real-world data was con-
ducted. In the first set, we used the BDNS extension27 and in the second one
we used the Namecoin28 and the Emercoin29 blockchain platforms. We argue
that the most critical domain names are the top ones of the Alexa list, as they
handle most user traffic. Therefore, if an adversary would like to take over a
domain, a domain in the Alexa top 1,000 domains would provide her with the
biggest impact. In what follows, we will refer to A1K as the dataset of the
Alexa top 1000 domains at the time of writing.
4.1 Using BDNS
BDNS is an open-source extension for Chrome and Firefox. The goal of the
extension is to resolve .bit, .lib, .emc, .coin, .bazar and OpenNIC domains30.
The extension monitors the requests of the browser for domains. If the domain
falls within the supported TLDs, then it uses a RESTful interface to resolve the
IP.
Based on this concept, we created a crawler which queries uses this REST
interface and tries to resolve A1K domains with any of these TLDs. The result
of this search was that 464 domains out of the potential 25,000 web pages
(i.e. generated from the combination of A1K with the different TLDs) were
registered. These 464 web pages were mapped to 465 IPs, as one of the DNS
records mapped a domain to two IPs. Interestingly, 21 of these IPs were private
and 444 public ones. The latter were actually 55 unique addresses, one of which
was used to resolve 220 of these web pages, and 81 belong to another IP address,
signifying a high concentration. In terms of countries, these domains resolve to
15 countries, as illustrated in Table 3.
Going a step further, we browsed each of the domains. From the 464 do-
mains, 163 did not resolve anywhere or returned an error in the server-side
and 9 to a default welcome landing page of a service, e.g. IIS Server. Then,
80 pages redirected the user to a porn web page (https://iusr.co) which
belonged to the same IP address (192.243.100.192). Note that the latter IP
served only this web page with the exception of one page that was down.
Then, many of the pages resolved to placeholder pages. Three of them re-
solved to the same IP (161.97.219.84) pointing to “Computer Rehab domain
hosting”, 11 pointed to a parking domain of dotbit.me with the same IP
(144.76.12.6). 67 domains were registered as part of the project New Nations
http://www.new-nations.net from a single IP (178.254.31.11). The latter
IP also resolved 76 more web pages that were divided into three placeholder
web pages (ww1.partenka.net,ww17.cikidot.com, ww38.partenka.net) with
63 in the first one, 3 in the second and 9 in the last one. Notably, from the
27https://blockchain-dns.info
28https://www.namecoin.org/
29https://emercoin.com/
30https://www.opennic.org/
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domains that resolved to the same one listed in A1K (34), almost half of them
(16) belonged to porn web sites. The rest 18 of them belonged to 11 web pages,
including Wikipedia, Instagram and mega.
Country IPs Country IPs Country IPs
DE 238 CA 5 AT 1
US 146 SG 3 HK 1
CN 20 GB 2 IT 1
FR 12 NL 2 SE 1
RU 9 SC 2 TW 1
Table 3: Distribution by country
4.2 The Namecoin data
Namecoin was the first widely-used Blockchain DNS, becoming a reference point
for more recent approaches such as Emercoin and Blockstack. This blockchain
manages the registrar of the .bit TLD by means of a straightforward proce-
dure, in which users specify the SLD that they want to register (which will be
later appended with a .bit), as well as the resolving IP and other secondary
parameters. At the time of writing this article, Namecoin has a total of 91,106
active domains (i.e. they have been recently created or periodically renewed by
their owners). Nevertheless, despite the restrictions imposed by the registrar
procedure and the data structure template to be added in the blockchain as
well as the deviant behaviour of some users, we found some relevant statistics
that showcase the potential of Namecoin as a platform to impulse illicit activi-
ties. As a foreseeable tendency, most users opted for registering domains of low
length (from the set of domains offered by ICANN, practically all SLDs with
length lower than six are already registered or reserved), as described in Figure
3. Note that, as stated in Section 3.1, this hinders procedures such as AGDs
detection. Clearly, the fact that a domain has to be renewed every certain time
at a small cost, a feature which is not implemented in Emercoin as we will dis-
cuss in Section 4.3, prevents the ownership of domains for long periods of time
if there is no revenue. Nevertheless, this does not seem a constraint for some
users, as seen in Table 4. More concretely, a total of 86,940 addresses registered
at least one domain, yet there are users that own more than 1,000 domains,
which often contain the words sex, porn, stream, hack as well as other SLDs
from well-known brands and companies. Although most of them do not resolve
to an IP, this may change in almost real-time with a simple update.
Due to the fact that OpenNIC DNS servers, as well as a set of browser
extensions, resolve .bit domains, we found some other relevant statistics that
need to be discussed to give a clear picture of what is happening behind the
curtains. Since these findings include data extracted from Emercoin, we will
address them in the following section.
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Figure 3: Length distribution of domain names registered in Namecoin. Note
that values are represented in logarithmic scale.
Emercoin address # domains
MyZTAGS74akZBiqYPKuvD3zGCfL8tGmXpz 3754
MwyGuUCawVzCcCSoNJpWjN1Kcioq7TNM92 2213
N256bGgH4E84P8fcEcLs4m1YCXYZb6nzAm 1690
MwkmRsY2kVjgXp2x4j9LY9fwtvXdMSaLjj 64
NJ6HHqGu9mmW25XgyGoj7V6hPoCSkQLnQ6 64
N8sV3CJsQo83GRKw5qyBECCiFwvp1XQ2Nu 16
NBHBXLtbRLFqHRmgTufzL1aZ3ztqHyLmXH 16
MzB1bm2QDmqpmAKeaRPev4QxAxTWj1kZRi 14
NEm1R3yMmvGckDCa9Tt9XY8Yor3tEVfReb 14
NKesEinH7phBMdu3XT5KTw5eQtRoXnxhT6 10
Table 4: Top 10 addresses in Namecoin with most registered domains.
4.3 The Emercoin data
The Emercoin blockchain is one of the most well-known services for domain reg-
istration. In total, the blockchain contains 53,408 records at the time of writing.
Interestingly, although the naming requirements of Emercoin specify that only
lowercase alphanumeric ASCII characters are allowed, the chain contains case
sensitive domains not only for the advertised TLDs but for standard TLDs like
.com. The distribution of the domains is illustrated in Table 5. In this regard,
we observed that most of the addresses registered one or two domains (i.e. a
total of 43,543 addresses registered at least one domain in Emercoin), some
addresses registered more than 1,000 domains, as showed in Table 6. Many of
these records contained an IP, an email address, or a note advertising that the
domain is for sale. More concretely, by querying the Emercoin blockchain, we
found that up to 567 domains contain the words “for sale” in their value field,
and in most cases an email to contact. Moreover, when searching for “$” in
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the value field, the search returned more than 100 domains with a specific sale
value. Finally, correlating the A1K dataset with the Emercoin chain returned
1,045 domains, which correspond to 328 unique SLDs registered with different
TLD variants.
Feature Registered domains
.com TLD 44
Punycode (xn–) 1261
Capital letters 316
Whitespace character 35
Table 5: Lexical statistics for domain names registered in Emercoin.
Emercoin address # domains
ETkxi1X1CeX2QDSWp3CDmuDj7jJZtftfNF 3565
EKzDF4RAHat8tWdQGbvR9zm7PJrHcth7Rm 2688
EQADxQhroZwGnQAyirFtNbwwjoykciFqv3 253
EYBExDLR3aqZunRj6NuyRC9TXt8NHKKXWZ 196
ENnpjY8YQr5rvKNc1TY6kkBwsDZXwmEiY2 150
EWwX61CW9TorzZ7Dy1dmnfKYPxz7dBMGxJ 137
EaQkdxCMPVzMXtTFqYaQxV7wQ1qqLy8aXF 58
ELRNsgvTbV83MyPdD5ACf1xyemLFV7Sued 53
ESCWovPDaX55KCpX3bdkKWqbH4zBEiwNrd 47
EZKCa2ELZpPoNPFQrsHQXszFLrPEf9Q5vJ 44
Table 6: Top 10 addresses in Emercoin with most registered domains.
The domain name length distribution is depicted in Figure 4. Notably,
most of the domains have lengths below five, with three letters being the most
registered domains (as in the case of Namecoin). As previously stated, these
SLD are no longer available in ICANN, since they are already registered, and
are among the first to be registered once a new TLD appears. Given the high
correlation with ICANN domains, it is expected that many of them, if they do
not belong to the corresponding ICANN owners, are highly likely to be used for
malicious activities such as phishing or cybersquatting.
Finally, some statistics of the domain registering behaviour over time are
depicted in Figure 5, which shows the domains registered since the beginning
of the blockchain until October 2019. Notably, we can see some peaks in its
lifetime.
The distribution in time of the domains registered with .com was also inves-
tigated. As seen in Figure 6, such practices, although not alarmingly numerous,
are still active in 2019. Therefore, the registrar system still allows the regis-
tration of domains with TLDs different than these offered by Emercoin. This
problem is related to several of the threats discussed in Section 3, such as the
vulnerabilities with the underlying registrar, which may enable further malware
and phishing campaigns, as well as cybersquatting.
Finally, we computed some global statistics for Namecoin and Emer-
coin. Currently, there are more than 140K domain names registered in both
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Figure 4: Length distribution of domain names registered in Emercoin. Note
that values are represented in logarithmic scale.
blockchains, but only 5,266 have an IP associated with them31. Out of these
5,266, we computed the distribution of TLDs and depicted the results in Table
7. We can observe that most of domains belong to .coin, .bit, .lib, .bazar,
and .emc. Note that some of the other TLDs should not be “available”, with
special regard of the whitespace character. Next, we wanted to explore what
the distribution of IPs controlling these domains is. In this regard, the top 15
IPs used for that purpose are described in Table 8. Notably, we may observe
that 192.243.100.192 is the IP to which most domains resolve (i.e. a total of
1957 domains).
TLD Number TLD Number TLD Number
coin 1261 $ 1 net 1
bit 1045 oz 1 ln 1
lib 1017 1 in 1
bazar 998 bbs 1 9988 1
emc 861 news 1 kib 1
i2p 19 ua 1 fashion 1
neo 14 luxsocks 1 woshiwo321 1
com 8 mayun 1 name 1
onion 3 years 1 www 1
cn 3 pi 1 cion 1
coin 2 aaatttaaa 1 mec 1
eth 2 io 1 su 1
enc 1 liib 1 biz 1
org 1 linux 1 1010 1
Table 7: Distribution of TLDs resolving to an IP in both Emercoin and Name-
coin.
31https://blockchain-dns.info/explorer/
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Figure 5: Timeline of registered domains in Emercoin. Note that values are
represented in logarithmic scale.
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Figure 6: Timeline of .com domains registered in Emercoin.
5 Discussion and Countermeasures
Arguably, the aforementioned threats seem to portray an obscure future. In
what follows, we propose a set of mitigation strategies and mechanisms for each
of the identified threats.
As described in Section 4.3 the Emercoin registrar allows some theoretically
forbidden patterns and characters, including the .com TLDs. These practices,
although uncommon, are still active, as seen in Figure 6. In the case of Name-
coin, the periodic renewal mechanism, as well as the fact of only controlling one
TLD, enables higher control of data, yet both blockchains have similar patterns
and user behaviours as analysed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. As such, more robust
mechanisms have to be implemented in the future to avoid deviant behaviours.
These mechanisms should cover the whole registrar procedure in an end-to-end
manner, from the auction systems (e.g. with robust smart contracts and revo-
cation mechanisms, triggered according to a majority) to the proper checking
of the data structures stored in the blockchain so that malicious/unexpected in-
formation cannot be inserted. Other solutions and functionalities such as forks,
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IPs Domains IPs Domains
192.243.100.192 1957 78.107.255.15 53
144.76.12.6 448 192.241.241.153 45
202.108.22.5 402 202.108.8.82 45
192.227.233.13 340 81.2.247.158 45
178.128.220.134 144 94.242.60.7 37
185.31.209.8 88 185.61.138.167 32
178.32.148.152 67 46.29.251.130 29
92.63.101.1 53
Table 8: Top 15 IPs to which domains resolve in both Emercoin and Namecoin.
which will be later described for the case of the immutability threat, could also
be adopted.
In the case of cybersquatting, several strategies have been implemented by
systems like Handshake, in which they pre-reserved the top 100k Alexa domains.
Other similar policies may be implemented in future decentralised DNS systems
as well as a controlled flow of domains being registered, to prevent users from
registering arbitrary amounts of domains. Due to the unrestricted nature of
Blockchain DNS systems, users may register the most used SLDs and append
one of the multiple TLDs offered by the new blockchain DNS registrars. As
previously stated, the appearance of blockchain DNS systems which aim to
register and resolve all the domain spectrum (both in terms of SLDs and TLDs),
may create different versions of the Internet. In this scenario, the challenge of
controlling the domain name registration as well as the resolution will require
unprecedented security and privacy mechanisms.
Email had always accommodated a noteworthy attack surface due to the
lack of security considerations since its inception. The evolution of email secu-
rity at some point called upon the DNS infrastructure to address integrity and
authentication issues as an attempt to prevent certain types of spam and phish-
ing. Email security policies and protocols such as the Sender Policy Framework
(SPF), Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) and Domain Message Authen-
tication Reporting (DMARC) which depend upon DNS can be extended and
adapted to force checks on domains and prevent domain spoofing attempts. In
addition, the email clients should include scanning and checking functionality to
distinguish between the different emerging parallel Internets attributed to dif-
ferent blockchain DNS entries. The email servers (and MTAs in general) could
enforce tighter policies by requiring properly configured DMARC services. In
essence, the email ecosystem could act in this instance as the gatekeeper prior
to entering the blockchain DNS controlled realm.
The decentralised nature of blockchain DNS is expected to change and im-
prove the botnets’ C2 communication channels, by providing more effective
rendez-vous algorithms than the current DGAs. Fewer NXDomain responses,
covert channels and encrypted communications are expected. Traffic analysis
similar to the one described by [21] is expected to be less effective. This new
state of play would require more proactive approaches such as hunting for syn-
thesised IoC type of patterns in the blockchain itself, not only limited in the
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domain information, but also all available metadata. The immutability of the
blockchain would allow to continuously and reliably study the botnets’ modus
operandi and respond with mitigation actions.
The immutability of blockchains requires other approaches to counter ma-
licious records. Although less popular, forks are a well-known mechanism to
“delete” data from the blockchain [24]. Nevertheless, forks are used only in
exceptional cases, and are not considered to be an efficient solution, since they
add a prohibitive overhead to the system, especially if the number of deletion
requests is high. Other strategies regarding the block consolidation mechanism
(the number of blocks created in front of the actual block for it to be considered
safe) can also be explored, yet, again, they could hinder the efficiency of the
system. In terms of blockchains, technical efforts to circumvent immutability
while preserving their inherent security are steadily emerging [24].
Finally, it should be emphasised that in order for such initiatives to become
mainstream and not a tool for cybercrime, they need to build trust on their
services. At their current form it is evident that both Namecoin and Emercoin
have already many issues as their users face many privacy and security issues.
Therefore, moderation solutions must be deployed to protect the name of the
emerging ecosystem. The moderation may prevent poisoning of the chains and
removal of malicious records making the users trust the provided services.
6 Conclusion
When a disruptive technology such as blockchain enters the realms of one of the
core Internet services such as DNS, it is imperative that the security community
invests a significant amount of effort to study and investigate the security im-
plications. The DNS hijacking incident back in 2014 where 300K routers were
compromised32, albeit having a high impact to businesses, is minuscule com-
pared to the potential damage malicious actors can cause when the blockchain
DNS becomes widely accepted.
This paper attempted to tessellate the emerging threats and provide insight
into the associated risks introduced by moving from a centralised to a fully de-
centralised DNS. From a forensic investigation perspective, the use of blockchain
is a mixed blessing; on the one hand, some of the evidence will be stored in a
forensically sound manner. On the other, the introduction of yet another tech-
nology into the Internet backbone will not only increase the complexity leading
to a potentially greater attack surface but will also result in significant attribu-
tion challenges.
32https://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/03/04/team_cymru_ids_300000_compromised_
soho_gateways/
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